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Physician Liability in the Age of Data Reliance and
Errors
Laura Montesantos*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first rule of any technology used in a business is that automation
applied to an efficient operation will magnify the efficiency. The second is
that automation applied to an inefficient operation will magnify the
inefficiency.1
- Bill Gates
Medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States
causing at least 250,000 deaths every year, indicating that patient safety
efforts fall short.2 In addition, errors related to improper patient diagnoses
were the largest contributor to medical malpractice claims for the five-year
period from 2013 to 2017.3 Such statistics give weight to the need for health
care reform by way of technological advancements that can improve the
safety and quality of medical care.
However, health care innovation opens new legal complications with
regards to liability, namely because of the complexity that underpins the
technology itself. For example, when an error occurs through the use of
technological advancements, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) or Machine
Learning (ML), it is difficult to make an assessment of who to hold
responsible for the medical error.4 As AI becomes more powerful, the
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1
Bill Gates, Bill Gates Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/authors/billgates-quotes (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
2
Steve Sternberg, Medical Errors Are Third Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., U.S. NEWS
(May 3, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-05-03/medical-errors-are-thirdleading-cause-of-death-in-the-us (It is important to note that some of the statistics referenced
are being questioned as over inflated).
3
Maria Castellucci, Diagnostic Errors Are Largest Contributor to Medical Malpractice
Claims, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180313/NEWS/180319965/diagnostic-errorsare-largest-contributor-to-medical-malpractice-claims.
4
Artificial Intelligence is defined as the development of computer systems able to perform
tasks that normally require human intelligence. Machine learning is the concept of machines
learning through experience or example. As such, AI is the broader concept including
machine learning and other technologies. See Evan Sweeney, Using AI for Diagnosis Raises
Tricky Questions About Errors, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (May 24, 2017),
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/analytics/using-ai-for-medical-diagnosis-raises-trickyquestions-about-errors.
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decision-making process becomes more difficult to understand.5
Furthermore, when the error has to do in part or in whole with the data that
is used to feed the complex algorithms that can drive diagnostic decisions, as
well as the data that is fed and transported across the continuum of care, the
question of legal liability becomes more complex.6 This legal question has
yet to be reconciled due to the early stage of adoption in the industry of such
innovations.7 The potential benefits of computerization could be substantial,
but Electronic Health Record Systems (EHR systems) also give rise to new
liability risks for healthcare providers that have received little attention in the
legal literature.8
This article argues that the current approach to establishing responsibility
and liability for errors in data collection, analysis, and transmission is lacking
clarity as well as applicable standards, which is detrimental to the necessary
expansion of artificial intelligence and other technology-driven mechanisms
that have great potential to enhance quality of care. This article will propose
a new federal statute that includes new standards and addresses how to set
liability rules for physicians who rely on technology as part of the diagnostic
process. The proposal will include a hierarchy of the legal theories to be
applied in liability claims when medical data errors impact the cause of
action.
Section II will examine existing legislation to describe the background of
health care technology regulations, as well as to detail the timeline of health
care technology laws, including important federal statutes and responsible
regulatory bodies. This examination will demonstrate that the focus of the
existing legislation has been on developing standards allowing data to be
interoperable to facilitate a connected health care community. The analysis
will further point out that with the primary focus on technical standards, there
has been a lack of attention on how liability will be assessed when data that
meets the required standards for sharing across medical systems becomes
compromised and leads to medical errors.
Section III will illustrate the extensive journey that health care data travels
as it becomes part of a patient’s medical record. Through examples and
diagrams, the reader will gain a clear understanding of potential errors
occurring from multiple points of failure. It will also illustrate the high
probability of technology errors occurring in patient encounters.
Section IV will include an examination of current legal theories available
in tort law that can be used to help determine liability for physicians in
situations of technology failure. The article will point out that new legal
5

Id.
Id.
7
See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and
Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1524, 1526 (2009) (discussing
the use of Electronic Health Records and the potential liability associated with technology).
8
Id. at 1527.
6
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theories are not necessarily required, instead suggesting the application of
existing legal standards through a specific legal hierarchy. The examination
will include analysis of specific tort laws including product liability,
specifically the doctrines of strict liability, negligence, and breach of
warranty. This article will review the current law to determine if it is more
appropriate to use the laws as they are currently designed, or to recommend
modifications when assessing physician liability. Section IV will also
examine medical malpractice laws and how they may need to be changed to
meet the new challenge of technology failure as it relates to physicians.
Finally, Section V will formalize a legal standard that can be used as part
of new federal legislation to determine liability for physicians. The intent of
the legal standard will be to close any gaps that exist in the current law
regarding liability, applying current legal standards in a specific way to fill
those gaps. The new legal framework will include a three-prong test with the
added intent of standardizing the legal process for these situations. This
framework can minimize the complex legal challenges that plaintiffs and
defendants face when involved in a suit for medical errors that involve
software and data issues.
It will be noted that new legislation should balance clarifying standards
for liability purposes against being so restrictive that it stifles innovation in
health care technology.9
It is already the case that technology advances are becoming intertwined
with health care. The data associated with new technologies is a critical piece
in providing information that affects the way physicians treat patients. As
patient data “ownership” and control is transmitted through multiple data
entry points, data capture and distribution entities, and cloud computing,
physician liability exposure related to patient data utilization resulting from
faulty data, data transmission, and storage will become even more complex.
II. LEGISLATIVE GROUNDWORK
A. Background
There are numerous benefits of connecting health care systems and health
care data.10 Interoperability can help minimize patient exposure to poor
execution and bad planning.11 Strong electronic medical records (EMR) use,
which includes electronic data, is key for better care coordination between
primary care doctors and specialists.12 For example, a patient may see a
9

W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 471
(2017).
10
Christopher Jason, How Interoperability Drives Care Coordination Over Care
Continuum, EHR INTEL. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/howinteroperability-drives-care-coordination-over-care-continuum.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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number of physicians for care, each of whom determines the best care plan
to address the patient’s medical concerns.13 Without visibility to the entirety
of the patient’s medical history, each doctor may prescribe medications that
only address a single medical issue, medications may have negative drug
interactions when taken together, or the care plan prescribed may have a
negative effect for another medical issue the doctor is unaware exists.14 If
each physician does not have full access to the patient care plan, the
possibility of creating new issues for the patient increases.15 When
physicians and healthcare providers can view a comprehensive medical
record for a patient, they can better diagnose potential health issues and
develop a complete care plan to address the whole patient instead of a single
symptom.16
Coordinated care also reduces health care costs by helping to eliminate
repetitive tests and procedures, and reducing hospital stays.17 A study by the
Johns Hopkins Community Health Partnership team in 2018 evaluated costs
and utilization changes across multiple care settings, including acute care and
community health interventions.18 The study found positive outcomes such
as lowering emergency department use and minimizing follow up
appointments in the acute care group.19 Similarly, the community group
intervention was associated with statistically significant reductions in
avoidable hospitalizations, emergency department utilization, and lower
readmission rates.20 Although the study found variation depending on
population of the intervention studied, it did point to the boost in patient
outcomes while offering opportunity for cost containment and cost savings.21
In addition, for patients, the ability to access historical and current
information about their own health journey can provide the necessary records
they need to make good decisions and help them better tackle the
responsibility of managing their own health.22 Federal regulators agree.23 In
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Scott A. Berkowitz et al., Association of a Care Coordination Model with Health Care
Costs and Utilization: The Johns Hopkins Community Health Partnership (J-CHIP), JAMA
NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2018.
19
Dhruv Khuller & Dave Chokshi, Can Better Care Coordination Lower Health Care
Costs?, JAMA NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2018; see also Berkowitz, supra note 18 (discussing the
study results referenced).
20
Khuller, supra note 19.
21
Id.
22
Rachel Z. Arndt, Patients Pave the Way for Interoperability, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr.
28, 2018),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180428/NEWS/180429919/patients-pave-theway-for-interoperability.
23
Id.
14
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2018, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced a
proposed rule, titled “promoting interoperability,” which would give patients
more control over their health information.24 Under this approach, the onus
is on the patient to be the steward of their own care and access to medical
records can help patients take better control of this responsibility.25 As
patients’ medical history expands and memory fades, access to medical
records becomes increasingly important.
For technology organizations that collect and analyze data records, the
ability to link information and connect health points will allow these
companies to create powerful algorithms that can proactively alert
individuals to health risks.26 It is predicted that heath care usage of AI, which
relies on algorithms that are fed big data, will grow at an annualized rate of
48% between 2017 and 2023.27 AI technologies will be used for important
medical purposes such as risk analysis, treatment diagnosis, and medical
imaging reads.28 By accessing millions of data records, AI can take physician
training and clinical experience and scale it to unforeseen levels resulting in
heightened certainty of diagnosis and treatment path.29 The majority of
health systems have or will eventually adopt these new technologies as part
of the standard of care which can expose physicians to a new area of
liability.30 It could be a situation where the physician could be held liable for
technology they don’t understand, which has the potential to provide
unpredictable results.31 This ambiguity can make physicians hesitant to
utilize new technology, which may be to the detriment of patient care.32
Technology companies including Amazon, Google, and IBM made an
announcement in 2018 that they will be taking steps to advance data sharing

24

Id.; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PROMOTING INTEROPERABILITY PROGRAMS,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms (last
modified Sept. 16, 2021).
25
Arndt, supra note 22.
26
Matt Collier et al., Artificial Intelligence: Healthcare’s New Nervous System, ACCENTURE
1 (2017).
27
Id. at 2; Alicia Phaneuf, Use of AI in Healthcare & Medicine is Booming – Here’s How
the Medical Field is Benefiting from AI in 2021 and Beyond, INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/artificial-intelligence-healthcare.
28
10 Common Applications of Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, NOVATIO (last visited
Oct. 7, 2021), https://novatiosolutions.com/10-common-applications-artificial-intelligencehealthcare/.
29
Alice Park, How Robots are Changing the Way You See a Doctor, TIME (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://time.com/4967153/artificial-intelligence-machine-learning/.
30
See generally Scott J. Schweikart, Who Will Be Liable for Medical Malpractice in the
Future? How the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine Will Shape Medical Tort Law, 22
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2021) (discussing the impacts of artificial intelligence on
physician liability and medical malpractice).
31
Id. at 4–5.
32
Id.
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standards in order to promote interoperability in healthcare.33 The following
year, the companies reaffirmed their commitment at the CMS Blue Button
2.0 Developer Conference, releasing a joint statement affirming that
“interoperability requires the ability to share clinical information across
systems, networks, and care providers.”34 The statement added that “Barriers
to data interoperability sit at the core of many process problems”, and they
“believe that better interoperability will unlock improvements in individual
and population-level care coordination, delivery, and management.”35 It is
likely that the companies mentioned previously, Amazon, Google, and IBM
and other industry leaders, will continue to innovate with new software tools
that augment a doctor’s diagnostic and treatment expertise.36 Innovations in
healthcare AI, often fueled by big data,37 are helping reduce human error,
decrease turnaround time for labs and scans, thus making treatment more
efficient.38 This surge in data accessibility, however, brings up the important
question of who is liable for patient safety when the data that is used for
diagnosis and care decisions is compromised.
A new focus of the health care data science field is the technical standards
needed to connect disparate data sources and create interoperable systems.39
At both the federal and industry levels, solutions are being discussed
regarding the methodology and format that should be implemented to allow
different technologies to be able to read and send data in a structured way.40
While the industry is working to coalesce upon data connection solutions,
new legal issues concerning data integrity will emerge as more actors and
data sources become intertwined—many of which already face data
integration challenges.
When physicians view clinical data to make patient health decisions, they
will likely assume the data is correct. With increased sources and actors
collecting the data, technology companies must assure the data is accurate
across multiple services platforms. Clarity as to how to assess risk for
liability will help both software manufacturers and physicians better
33

Hanna Crouch, Tech Companies Renew Pledge to Support Interoperability in Health,
DIGITALHEALTH (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.digitalhealth.net/2019/08/tech-companiesreview-health-interoperability-pledge/.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Park, supra note 29.
37
Id.
38
NOVATIO, supra note 28.
39
Schweikart, supra note 30, at 4.
40
See CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR
INTEROPERABILITY AND BURDEN REDUCTION, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Interoperability/index (last modified Sept. 27, 2021); Moritz Lehne et
al., Why Digital Medicine Depends on Interoperability, NPJ DIGITAL MEDICINE ( Aug 20,
2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-019-0158-1 (arguing that interoperability
between systems is necessary to unlock the potential of digital medicine, specifically in the
areas of medical communication, research, and international cooperation).
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understand their own obligations in assuring clinical data accuracy.
Physicians who rely on this data will be making important determinations
that affect patients. This thesis will discuss the question of who is liable
when the data relied upon by healthcare providers is incorrect.
B. The Legislation
Historically, the intent of federal regulations related to health care data and
interoperability has been focused on patient privacy, security, and access,
while promoting data sharing.41
1. HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (will be referred
to as “the Act” or “HIPAA”), enacted in 1996, purported to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of health care by encouraging the development
of a health information system through the establishment of standards and
requirements for the electronic transmission of health care data.42 Although
privacy was not explicitly stated in the name of the Act, privacy became
synonymous with the law.43 The portability aspect of the Act, which refers
to an individual’s ability to control how their health information is used, laid
the foundation for sharing data between healthcare providers and across
health systems in an effort to encourage better visibility across the entirety of
a patient’s care continuum.44 Data access in this way enables an inclusive
health care experience by “allowing the flow of health information needed to
provide and promote high quality health care and to protect the public’s
health and well-being.”45 HIPAA created standards for data exchange with
a focus on what data can be shared, with whom, and how the data needs to
be protected.46 Although HIPAA did not specifically create the technology
standards for how data is to be shared, it was the first step in establishing a
federal regulation for the transmission of patient data. Over the next decade,
it became apparent that to properly exchange health care data, the data needed
41
Interoperability and Patient Access Fact Sheet, CMS, Mar. 9, 2020,
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/interoperability-and-patient-access-fact-sheet.
42
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201); OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (last updated July 26, 2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html.
43
Id.at 2–3.
44
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HIPAA AND HEALTH
PLANS – USES AND DISCLOSURES FOR CARE COORDINATION AND CONTINUITY OF CARE,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/3014/uses-and-disclosures-for-carecoordination-and-continuity-of-care/index.html (last updated June 26, 2019).
45
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (HIPAA) (last updated Sept. 14, 2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/hipaa.html.
46
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 42, at 1.
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to be stored electronically.47 Importantly, HIPAA did not address the liability
exposure ramifications of data sharing and does not provide patients with a
private right of action.48
2. HITECH Act
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act (will be referred to as “HITECH” or “HITECH Act”),49 which was part
of the 2009 economic stimulus package titled “The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act” addressed data standards and encouraged the adoption of
electronic health records to facilitate the ability to share those records through
technology.50 Specifically, HITECH was an important progenitor of digital
records since, prior to its adoption in 2009, fewer than one in ten hospitals
across the US had incorporated EMR systems.51 As electronic adoption
remained slow in the prior decade, HITECH “was created to motivate the
implementation of electronic health records and supporting technology.”52
Although these new laws had multiple purposes for health care, the
technology component was fundamental to the other purposes, including
better health care outcomes.53
The ultimate goal of the HITECH Act was to encourage providers to use
electronic records in a “meaningful” way.54 “Meaningful use” was a term
used to define minimum government standards for electronic medical
records, outlining how clinical patient data should be exchanged between
healthcare providers, between providers and insurers, and between providers
and patients.55 HITECH used incentives in the form of monetary payments
to physicians, hospitals and health systems to help achieve the purpose of
moving away from paper-based medical records and to move providers to
utilize electronic records so as to facilitate better outcomes.56 The monetary
47
Karen B. DeSalvo & Vindell Washington, By the Numbers: Our Progress in Digitizing
Health Care, HEALTH IT BUZZ (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/healthdata/numbers-progress-digitizing-health-care.
48
Nicolas P. Terry & Lindsay F. Wiley, Liability for Mobile Health and Wearable
Technologies, 25 ANNALS HEALTH L. 62, 95 (2016).
49
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 226 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj et seq., 17901 et seq.).
50
Jane H. Thorpe et al., Show Us the Data: The Critical Role Health Information Plays in
Health System Transformation, 44 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 593 (2016) (discussing the
purpose of the HITECH Act).
51
DeSalvo & Washington, supra note 47.
52
See COMPLIANCY GROUP, What is the HITECH Act?, https://compliancy-group.com/whatis-the-hitech-act/ (last updated Oct. 7, 2021).
53
DeSalvo & Washington, supra note 47.
54
Joseph D. Szerejko, Note, Reading Between the Lines of Electronic Health Records: The
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and Its Implications
for Health Care Fraud and Information Security , 47 CONN. L. REV. 1103, 1107 (May 2015).
55
Id. at 1112.
56
Id. at 1109.
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incentives were also meant to lessen the expense of implementing electronic
medical records, especially for smaller provider groups and health systems,
in an effort to digitize all data records no matter where the patient received
care.57 The success of the program was dependent on not just the
implementation of an electronic medical record system, but also the use of
the technology.58
Rules promulgated pursuant to HITECH59 by HHS have since tightened
up privacy and security requirements by enacting tougher penalties for
HIPAA noncompliance, including breaches. Although the topic of legal
liability was a part of the regulatory update,60 the focus was centered on
HIPAA violations and enforcement, with HITECH increasing the legal
liability for non-compliance and providing more stringent enforcement of the
law.61 HITECH did not specifically address areas of liability for data
exchange resulting in compromise, inaccuracy, or failure.62
3. The Affordable Care Act
After the HITECH Act, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010,63 which
had the noble purpose of lowering the cost of government spending on health
care while extending access to care to more Americans, also included
provisions to improve health care quality using technology.64 Along with
provisions to expand access to health insurance coverage and an increase in
consumer insurance protections, the ACA strove to improve quality and
system performance by investing in health information technology and
encouraging electronic medical records, among other things.65 The ACA
established uniform standards for health information technology systems in
order to facilitate the financial incentives for providers, and in some cases,
mandate the programs, such as the Physician Quality Reporting System
(PQRS).66
Another provision of the ACA that encouraged electronic data exchange
and interoperability was the creation of Health Information Exchanges

57

Id. at 1106–7.
Id. at 1109.
59
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 5556, 5570 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164).
60
Id. at 5573 (including subcontractors in the definitions of business associate, thus
expanding liability).
61
Id.at 5582–83 (increasing civil monetary penalties for violations by covered entities).
62
Id.
63
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
58
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(HIE).67 HIE’s collect data from many different care systems and allow these
providers access to the entire patient medical record.68 In doing so, the HIE’s
promise to enhance the quality and efficiency of care delivery.69
Unfortunately, this promise has yet to be fulfilled as HIEs have struggled to
gain wide acceptance in the market, specifically in certain regions.70 Since
healthcare is predominately local, markets that do not have strong regional
sharing within an HIE will not see any value in the technology.71 However,
industry experts are hopeful that the value proposition of HIEs will help lead
to success in those markets that have had a difficult time adopting the new
technology.72
The important connecting theme of the ACA provisions in relation to
interoperability is dependence, in great part, on the ability to use and
exchange health information across a more integrated delivery system.73 The
critical importance of data interoperability in health care has led to legislation
with a primary focus on how to connect disparate systems and how to keep
the data secure. Although these focal points are of great significance, there
is a gap in addressing how properly connected, secure data, can also lead to
problematic health care situations when there is data error. The gap extends
to the question of liability when such errors occur.
4. The 21st Century Cures Act
After a decade of regulating electronic medical records, there remains
concerns that increased focus is still needed, particularly in the areas of
improved interoperability, error reporting, and tighter control of medical
records as medical devices.74 The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act)
addresses these areas as it helps accelerate medical product development and
advances to health care information technology.75 The Cures Act calls on the
67
See Thorpe, supra note 50, at 593 (discussing the development of entities, such as the
HIEs, “that encourage the growth of integrated care delivery and payment models . . .”).
68
OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., What is HIE?,
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/health-it-and-health-information-exchange-basics/what-hie
(last updated July 24, 2020).
69
Id.
70
See Mike Miliard, State and Regional HIE’s: ‘Don’t Count Us Out Just Yet!’, HEALTHIT
NEWS (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/state-and-regional-hies-dontcount-us-out-just-yet (quoting various regional HIE business executives on the success and
obstacles of HIE implementation).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
See id. (discussing the importance of health information exchanges in reference to the
health care market success).
74
John Jay Kenagy, Regulating Electronic Health Records Through the “Nuclear” Threat
and Other Enforcement Options: Federal Government Actions to Compel HER Industry
Changes, 33 HEALTH LAW. 5, 14 (Feb. 2021).
75
21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat.1033 (2016) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 201) [hereinafter Cures Act].
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health care industry to adopt standardized application programming
interfaces (APIs) to allow secure access to electronic data by patients and
care providers.76 APIs, in simple terms, are the standards with which
computer systems interact or “talk” to each other.77 The Cures Act also
strives to implement strict penalties for “information blocking,” when access
to information does not fall into an exception category.78 Information
blocking is when a healthcare provider, health information technology
developer, health information exchange, or health information network
engages in a practice likely to interfere with, prevent, or materially
discourage the access, exchange, or use of electronic health information.79
While some reasons for blocking data may be legitimate, such as for privacy
or security purposes, other reasons may be more nefarious, such as to
monetize data access for revenue or market share purposes. The Cures Act
uses penalties and disincentives to discourage the latter.80
The Cures Act also defines categories of software not included in the Food
and Drug Administration’s (FDA) jurisdiction.81 The FDA is the regulatory
body responsible for medical devices and the software embedded within
them, where the software affects the safety of the device as a whole.82 In late
2017, the FDA enacted a “Digital Health Action Plan” in an effort to give
health care consumers timely access to high-quality, safe, and effective
digital health products.83 The goal of the action plan is to foster collaboration
and enhance communication to digital health customers, as well as to develop
and implement regulatory strategies and policies for digital health
technologies.84 The FDA recognizes the rapid convergence of health care
technologies and the need for approval at a fast pace.85 As part of the digital
health action plan, the FDA provides a tool for mobile app developers so they
can understand what laws apply based on the kind of health app that is being
developed.86 Important to note, the federal regulatory body has recognized
76

Id. at § 4002.
What is an API? (Application Programming Interface), MULESOFT,
https://www.mulesoft.com/resources/api/what-is-an-api.
78
Cures Act, supra note 75, at § 4004; see also OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR
HEALTH INFO. TECH., Information Blocking, HEALTH IT
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/information-blocking (last reviewed Mar. 19, 2021).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Cures Act, supra note 75, at § 3060.
82
Software as a Medical Device (SaMD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (last edited Dec. 4,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/software-medical-device-samd.
83
Digital Health Innovation Action Plan, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.; see also Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (Apr., 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-apps-interactivetool (demonstrating how the tool interacts with applicable laws).
77
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the criticality of regulatory action in the area of health care technology.87
Further clarity in the area of liability concerns seems like a next step in the
process.
To fully understand the impact of software on the health care industry, it
is important to look in more detail at the regulations that govern medical
technology.88 Determining if FDA requirements are met, as part of data
interoperability, will be the first step in assessing liability, as discussed in the
following section.
C. The Regulatory Body
The FDA could be the first line of scrutiny when determining liability for
health care data issues. Since data interoperability is an extension of the
software technology that enables this functionality, the FDA becomes part of
the legal framework that is responsible for regulation.
As previously detailed, in the last decade, software has become an integral
part of the health care experience. The prevalence of devices such as
smartphones, tablets, and computers has led to the creation of health care
software that incorporates these popular devices into the clinical decisionmaking processes.89 Algorithms are increasingly used to solve complex
health problems ranging from determining the best cancer treatment for a
patient based on genetic patterns, to identifying high risk patients based on
data point characteristics.90
Medical algorithms are defined as computer-based functions that help
make medical decisions or analyze medical information.91 Some examples
include computer diagnostics that categorize a tumor from an image,
predictive analytics programs that attempt to identify high risk patients based
on a list of factors before the risk actually materializes, and a smartphone app
that recommends diet choices based on an individual’s exercise patterns
combined with baseline medical information such as height and weight.92
Since errors in the data that run the software and algorithms can impact
patient care in dramatic ways, there was consensus among legislators that
there needed to be some form of regulation.93 But, in 2013, concerned that
87

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 83.
Melanie Fridgant, Technology Development in the Health Care Industry: Shaping the
Future of the Patient-Physician Relationship, 18 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 242 (2018).
89
IMDRF SaMD Working Grp., Software as a Medical Device (SaMD): Key Definitions,
INT’L DEVICE REGULATORS F. 4, 4 (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-key-definitions140901.pdf.
90
Price, supra note 9, at 423.
91
Id. at 425.
92
Price, supra note 9, at 425; see also Skygazer Labs, MySymptoms,
https://www.mysymptoms.net/ (detailing the features of a smartphone application that tracks
diet and symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome).
93
Price, supra note 9, at 439–42.
88
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the FDA may broadly regulate standalone medical software, the software
industry lobbied congress to intervene with specific clarifications.94 In
response, Section 3060(a) of the Cures Act removed five categories of
software from FDA jurisdiction as exclusions to the definition of a “medical
device,”95 to help encourage future innovation. Those exclusions exposed
gaps in the regulation of software particularly in the transferring of the
medical data. Left unanswered was the issue of if software falls into an
exclusion category and FDA regulation is not required, what standard should
be applied when there are data errors causing negative outcomes?
The following are the five categories of software that the Cures Act
excludes from FDA regulations as a medical device:
• Health care software that is used for administrative functions such as
billing and scheduling appointments,96
• Wellness software that encourages health activity if it does not cross
the line into diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a
disease or condition,97
• Electronic Health Record software provided it does not interpret or
analyze the data for the purpose of diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
prevention, or treatment of a disease or condition,98
• Medical device software that transfers, stores, converts format, or
displays clinical laboratory results or other health information, again
providing it does not cross the line into interpreting and analyzing the
data,99 and
• A subset of clinical decision support software.100
The distinction between software subject to regulation because it provides
a function of clinical diagnostics, and software not subject to regulation
because it doesn’t provide any diagnostic function, is important as a
regulatory line in the sand. Software that collects data, transfers the data to
another system, and provides information that the physician would ultimately
rely on for care decisions would fall outside of the FDA regulatory
framework because the software does not serve in a diagnostic capacity. This
creates ambiguity around what standards are required for software that falls
outside of this definition, as well as software that functions in a way where
the definition is blurred. Furthermore, the transmission, collection, and

94
Efthimios Parasidis, Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a Sensible Legal Framework,
20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 183, 199 (2019).
95
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (codifying § 201(h) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
defines the medical devices Congress has authorized the FDA to regulate).
96
Id. at § 360j(o)(1)(A).
97
Id. at § 360j(o)(1)(B).
98
Id. at § 360j(o)(1)(C)(iii).
99
21 U.S.C. § 321(h), supra note 95, at § 360j(o)(1)(D).
100
Id. at § 360j(o)(1)(E).
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storage of software data for accuracy and liability purposes brings up
additional variables that seem to escape the current regulatory landscape.
It is crucial to further explore the FDA regulations for software that do not
fall into one of the exclusion categories specified in the Cures Act to help
illustrate where there are other gaps in regard to product liability. Software
as a medical device (SaMD) is defined by the International Medical Device
Regulators Forum (IMDRF) as “software that is intended to be used for one
or more medical purposes that performs these purposes without being part of
a hardware medical device.”101 The FDA defines medical device
interoperability as “the ability to safely, securely, and effectively exchange
and use information among one or more devices, products, technologies, or
systems.”102 FDA regulations are applied to software as a medical device
according to specific risk categories related to the significance of the
information provided by the software in making medical decisions, ranging
from non-serious to critical.103
The FDA has focused on regulation specific to the high-risk software
category for two reasons. First, technology is outpacing the law and it is
difficult to keep up from a regulatory standpoint.104 Second, the FDA has
industry pressure not to “over-regulate” to the extent that increased process
and oversight could stifle innovation.105
The FDA has defined software as a medical device by looking at the
software “risk category (I-IV) based on two main factors: the significance of
the information provided by the software (inform clinical collection, drive
clinical management, or treat or diagnose) and the state of the health care
situation or condition (non-serious, serious, or critical).”106 See Figure 1 for
an illustration of the FDA categories.

101

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 82.
Medical Device Interoperability, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/medical-device-interoperability.
103
IMDRF SaMD Working Grp., “Software as a Medical Device”: Possible Framework for
Risk Categorization and Corresponding Considerations, INT’L DEVICE REGUL. F. (Sept. 18,
2014), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-140918-samdframework-risk-categorization-141013.pdf.
104
How FDA Regulates Artificial Intelligence in Medical Products, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS, (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2021/08/how-fda-regulates-artificial-intelligence-in-medical-products.
105
Id.
106
Mike Rigert, Software as a Medical Device. What Does it Mean and Why Should I Care?
MASTERCONTROL (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.mastercontrol.com/gxp-lifeline/software-as-amedical-device-what-does-it-mean-and-why-should-i-care/.
102
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Figure 1107

Based on these distinctions, software that collects, stores, and transmits
data that is not critical falls outside of FDA regulation. However, if that data
is used to feed other systems that service diagnostic functions, it may be
subjected to FDA regulation, but the threshold at which that could happen is
not clear. To illustrate the FDA categories and how they apply to health care
software, consider the following examples.
Hospital A has purchased new innovative software from Software Vendor
B. The new software, AutoRead, is meant to assist radiologists through
reduction of human error and increased speed with reading imaging results.
The new software uses complex algorithms developed from patient data to
“learn” how to read exams. The software can also interpret other test results
in conjunction with the reads to come up with possible diagnoses for the
patient.108 AutoRead would likely fall into either category III or IV of the
FDA groups and be highly regulated by the FDA, because of the diagnostic
characteristics and the significance of how the software drives clinical
decision making.
Consider a different example. Hospital A also encourages its patients to
use a smartphone app, HeartBeat, to record resting heart rate after surgery.
The data is simply collected from the smartphone app and sent to the hospital
on a nightly basis. The data is then reviewed by surgeons as a part of a
program that remotely monitors patients after heart surgery. Here, the
manufacturer of HeartBeat will not be regulated, because HeartBeat is not
used in a diagnostic capacity and is only transferring and storing collected
data, even though it is producing critical data imperative to post-operative
107

Id.
See Chiara Longoni & Carey K. Morewedge, AI can Outperform Doctors so why Don’t
Patients Trust it?, HARV. BUS. REV., (Oct. 30, 2019) https://hbr.org/2019/10/ai-canoutperform-doctors-so-why-dont-patients-trust-it (explaining that the example is fictional,
but is based on actual software created by IBM Watson).
108
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care. There is a potential argument for HeartBeat to be characterized as a
higher category that would fall under FDA regulation since the data being
collected is after heart surgery. If the HeartBeat software failed to report the
correct data to the hospital and the surgeon could not review the information
in a timely fashion, or if they analyzed the faulty data and concluded there
was not a problem, this could lead to dire circumstances for the patient. If
the software is not subjected to FDA regulation, the manufacturer can try to
deny liability. Hospital A may then bear the responsibility if any harm came
to the patient due to this error. Conversely, if AutoRead did meet strict FDA
requirements as part of the software following all regulatory standards,
Vendor B can argue that the radiologist shares liability in this example. Also,
the radiologist may be held responsible to “double-check” the reads of the
software or they may be absolved of this responsibility. These issues bring
up valid gaps in the regulation regarding liability determination.
The examples highlight two areas of concern regarding physician liability.
First, if the medical software is subject to FDA regulation and the software
developer and company met the regulations, but an error still occurs, what
legal standard should apply in determining liability? Second, if the medical
software is not subjected to FDA regulation because it falls into an exclusion
category, and an error occurs, what standard should be used when assessing
liability for both the software vendor and the physician? The proposed
liability standard addressed in Section IV looks to evaluate what standard
should be used while assessing liability for both software vendors and
physicians for both areas of concern.
To further illustrate data interoperability, Section III will discuss a more
detailed example of how data moves between health care systems. The
example will also help to clarify the possible failure points as interoperability
becomes part of the medical standard of care.
III. ANATOMY OF AN ERROR - THE HEALTH CARE DATA JOURNEY
Data interoperability in health care seems like a simple concept. Doctors
should have access to patient information from many sources and multiple
software applications.109 Adoption of electronic records by health systems
and software vendors should be high, since data exchange is encouraged
through regulation and incentives.110 Still, many physicians see this kind of
electronic or computer-based innovation as another roadblock to patient-

109
Todd Shryock, Sharing Patient Data: Who Will Solve Interoperability, and When?, MED.
ECON. (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/sharing-patient-datachallenges-healthcare-interoperability.
110
Miriam Reisman, EHRs: The Challenge of Making Electronic Data Usable and
Interoperable, 42 PHARMACY THERAPEUTICS 572, 572 (2017).
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centered care, skeptical of the potential benefits.111 But as the technology
becomes more sophisticated, the standard of care for physicians will shift,
requiring physician adoption of certain technology such as AI and data
automation, despite reluctance. The possibility of being held liable for errors
caused by data systems that most physicians do not understand can further
add to physician hesitation.
A. Data Collection and Delivery
Consider the following hypothetical: Take a physician who is on the
cutting edge of technology. Her office incorporates the use of wearable
technologies that feed data direct from a personal device, such as a
smartphone or watch, to the medical record located in the physician’s office.
As part of a proactive care program, called “the preventative wellness
program,” the physician collects data from patient participants including
weight, blood pressure readings, and mobility information, such as how
many steps the patient takes each day. Most of the information is collected
directly from a technology device, using applications endorsed by the
physician.
The journey the data takes from the patient to the physician is complex
(see Figure 2 for a general diagram of the data transmission journey). Data
is collected on the wearable device either by automated or manual input.
Either through a synchronous process or a manual “push,” the data is sent
over the internet through a secured network or “Wi-Fi” connection to the data
server located either at the physician’s office or in the “cloud,” if the
physician uses a cloud-based electronic medical record. On the way from the
wearable device to the physician’s office, the data may make multiple “stops”
by means of at different cloud-based connectivity points. Once the data finds
a home in the physician’s medical record system, separate software must
check the data to ensure that it is matched to the correct patient record. The
data needs to go through a matching process to further ensure the data records
collected populate the correct patient record in the system. Patient-matching
software uses a patient medical record number (MRN) to match the data to
the patient. The electronic record system also needs to populate the correct
data point with the corresponding field in the record. For example, the data
points related to the patient weight need to populate the correct weight fields
in the electronic medical record. This may seem like a rudimentary process,
but it is important to make sure non-obvious data points populate the correct
field, so the data is not misinterpreted.
The physician can then use an automated system to alert users in her office
to view data records from the patient participants as a proactive measure for
111

See Shryock, supra note 109 (discussing how physicians are frustrated at the promise of
electronic medical records simplifying their work when it has instead caused them more
work, giving less time for patient care).
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scheduling follow up visits, assuring patients are adhering to care plans, and
to verify there are no “red-flags” for a patient indicating a potential problem.
This can help keep patients out of the emergency room and other high-cost
care delivery settings by catching issues before they become life threatening.
For those patients who participate in further data exchanges, such as with
an HIE, the data can be sent from the physician office to a cloud-based system
that collects data from multiple physicians. HIEs help to give physicians
better visibility of the entirety of the patient’s medical history and records
since data is collected from multiple sources such as primary care physicians,
specialty physicians and hospitals. The journey the data takes from the
physician’s office to the HIE is also complex, with similar “stops” and
matching concerns as discussed in the first stages of the data journey. The
security around each stopping point must meet federal standards such as
HIPAA, to ensure patient privacy and security.
The example above illustrates a small sample of the vast uses of
technology in health care and the potential for better patient care through
these innovative forces. Doctors can help patients with proactive wellness
and avoid the issue of patients waiting to see a doctor until their issue or
condition has reached a critical status. High-risk patients can be identified
and monitored in order to catch care gaps and keep patients out of high-cost
care settings, such as emergency rooms and inpatient hospital stays. The
example also illustrates the possible failure points as the data makes the
extensive journey from one system to another as it travels to its final location.
The points of failure are the focus of this analysis, as liability is assessed
when an error occurs in the interoperable data path.
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Figure 2112

B. Collection and Delivery Data Errors
Data can be compromised in multiple ways. This discussion will focus on
three ways errors can occur: software defects, hardware failure, and breach,
although this list is not exhaustive.113 What is important to note is not
necessarily how the data can be compromised, but that it can happen in many
ways. The possibility of errors occurring adds to the compelling argument
for a comprehensive legal standard to determine liability for these situations.
Anyone who has ever used a computer knows that software defects, or
“bugs,” are inevitable.114 Yet these defects, which cause software failures
and consequent economic losses, have not been subject to tort liability.115
112
Jennifer Bresnick, GAO:Lack of Data Standards Foils EHR Interoperability, HIE, EHR
INTEL. (Mar. 25, 2014), https://ehrintelligence.com/news/gao-lack-of-data-standards-foilsehr-interoperability-hie.
113
See Dean F. Sittig & Hardeep Singh, Defining Health Information Technology-related
Errors: New Developments Since to Err is Human, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1281,
1282 (2011) (discussing human errors, such as transposition of numbers, entering data in the
incorrect field, and other software interaction issues, can also occur).
114
Bryan H. Choi, Crashworthy Code, 94 WASH. L. REV. 39, 46 (2019).
115
Id. at 44.
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This may not be the case in the near future with software playing a key role
across multiple industries where the stakes have to do with safety and
health.116 One possible argument is that requiring strict liability on software
manufacturers would not yield defect-proof software but instead would
impede future innovation. This may be a particularly compelling argument
with healthcare technology since rapid advancements in technology hold
great promises for enhancing quality of care.117
Rather than holding software vendors to an impossible standard, realistic
measures should be incorporated as part of updated regulations to ensure
manufacturers are incorporating adequate software fault tolerance into their
designs.118 With traditional software failure, where work may be lost if the
computer crashes, the software company at fault would not be liable.119 As
software becomes more intertwined with complex human functions, such as
in health care, liability should and will be different. Existing product liability
law needs a thorough review to determine if it is robust enough to apply
broadly to the complex legal issues of software defects in a healthcare
environment.
The data journey example described above has the possibility of
corruption by way of software defects. Take the example of the portion of
the data app that collects patient data points. If a patient’s weight entry, on
the way to the electronic medical record, accidentally populates the systolic
blood pressure number because there is a defect in the software application,
the physician may misinterpret this data and flag the patient for possible high
blood pressure. Such a simple error can cause inefficiency for the physician’s
staff, but it may not create a situation where the health of the patient is at risk.
However, with so much information transmitting across health systems, one
can easily see how there could be a situation where such a defect may
negatively impact patient care.
Looking again at the data journey example, there is also a possibility of
hardware failure. If all the data points collected are correct, the information
is transmitting properly, and the fields are populating correctly, hardware
capability would not come into question. As with software, however, it is
also possible that the hardware can fail, by way of a memory leak,120 power

116
Nicholas Terry, Of Regulating Healthcare AI and Robots, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 133,
135 (2019).
117
A. Michael Froomkin et al., When AIS Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Challenges
of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 35 (2019).
118
Choi supra note 114, at 39.
119
Id.
120
See Memory Leak, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/memoryleak (Mar. 27,
2008) (defining a memory leak as “a failure in a program to release discarded memory,
causing impaired performance or failure.”).
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outage, or even a certificate failure.121 Each failure possibility can have
detrimental effects on the data itself, potentially causing the data to stop
transmitting, shutting the system down, or corrupting the data elements,
rendering the information unusable.
Data errors can also occur when both software functions and hardware
systems are operating without issue. Bad actors, or hackers, can intercept
software transmissions, causing a data breach. Data breaches can create
devastating effects for the individuals whose data is hijacked, for users of the
software that rely on the data and the accuracy of the data, and for the
software vendors and corporations responsible for the data.
It is important to review the ways data errors can occur. First, it is
necessary to understand the underlying complexity of software code and the
support systems to be able to evaluate the issue of liability. Second, it is
important to understand how errors can occur to be able to propose realistic
standards that software vendors must meet to assess liability when errors
occur. If software vendors meet rigorous, yet attainable, standards for fault
tolerance, backup systems, and test requirements, the probability of errors
will be less likely to occur.
To accomplish the goal of setting a more rigorous standard, the FDA needs
to incorporate additional requirements for software vendors when it comes
to the mitigation of software issues. Without being restrictive and stifling
technology, the FDA should, as part of the Digital Health Action Plan,122
require software vendors to mitigate ramifications when software or
hardware errors occur. Because of the fundamental attributes of software
technology, software issues will remain prevalent and inevitable.123 It is
unrealistic to mandate error-free code from technology innovators as this
would ultimately stifle the industry,124 but realistic measures can help
minimize the consequences of the defects when they do occur.125
Using the data journey example once again, suppose there is an issue that
causes the blood pressure readings for all patients in the program to default
to 120/80 and to populate the physician’s electronic record with the erroneous
121
See Certificate, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/certificate (2006) (defining
certificate as “a site's certificate allows Internet Explorer to establish a secure connection
with the site. Certificate errors occur when there's a problem with a certificate or a web
server's use of the certificate. Internet Explorer helps keep your information more secure by
warning about certificate errors.”).
122
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. supra note 83 (discussing what the FDA’s
Digital Health Innovation Action Plan is).
123
Choi, supra note 114, at 86.
124
See id. at 72–73 (explaining that a prominent professor and the 7th Circuit prioritize the
economic interests of software vendors, who provide a unique and valuable product to
society, over the legal recourse of users against those vendors).
125
See id. at 110 (explaining “The crashworthy code framework … offers a nuanced
alternative to the bright-line schemes favored by consumer protectionism and technology
protectionism … [I]t redirects judicial scrutiny away from the initial code failure and instead
toward the subsequent mitigation response.”).
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data. Also, suppose that the clinical staff does not notice any irregularities,
and that the alert mechanism of the EMR has failed to trigger. During this
time, one of the physician’s elderly patients is admitted to the hospital
because of chest pains and dizziness. Who is responsible for any harm to the
patient: the physician, the software company, the hardware (blood pressure
reader) manufacturer, the data “transporter,” or someone else? Section IV
will examine this error against current product liability and medical
malpractice standards under existing tort law.
IV. LEGAL THEORIES - PRODUCT LIABILITY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The technology landscape of the healthcare industry is evolving at a rapid
pace, dominated by connected medical devices and connected data.126
“However, medical technology is not without vulnerabilities as connected
medical systems become the norm in patient care settings,” and the risk of
software errors, defects, and malicious attacks increase exponentially.127
“The Internet of Medical Things” (IoMT) is a sector of the digital health
industry at the forefront of medical technology.128 IoMT, simply defined, is
“the ability of healthcare devices to communicate, gather, and exchange data
across multiple platforms including Wi-Fi, virtual private networks, and
Internet platforms.”129 The IoMT differs from prior healthcare technology in
terms of its reliance on interconnectivity of countless devices and
participants.130 This reliance “requires the legal framework governing IoMT
to account for the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of numerous
stakeholders.”131 This is often not an easy task since the connectivity supply
chain is made up of multiple stakeholders, even in a simple transaction,
including software and hardware manufacturers, network providers, and
doctors.132 Furthermore, it is difficult to apportion liability amongst the
stakeholders because of the complexity of the technology and the lack of
clear boundaries to help establish fault.133 By examining traditional product
liability theory in the context of issues arising from the IoMT, we can

126
Bethany A. Corbin, When ‘Things’ Go Wrong: Redefining Liability for the Internet of
Medical Things, 71 S. C. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019).
127
Id.; see also Alaap Shah, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Cybersecurity Risk in the Health
Care Internet of Things, AM. HEALTH L. ASSN. WKLY. (May 18, 2018),
https://www.americanhealthlaw.org/content-library/health-law-weekly/article/b5b182cf04ee-4c9d-b5b0-4322cd60b9b1/Death-by-a-Thousand-Cuts-Cybersecurity-Risk-in-the
(discussing the privacy and security risks in health care technology innovation due to
interconnectivity, malicious actors, and improper development).
128
Corbin, supra note 126.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 2.
133
Id.
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determine whether the current structure can adapt to the nuances of the new
technology.
Product liability refers to a manufacturer’s legal liability to compensate
consumers for damages or injuries suffered because of defects in the
goods.134 A typical product liability case will involve a claim for damages
against the manufacturer or seller of a product by a person injured by the
product.135 The injured party will seek to prove that the injury was caused
by some deficiency in the way that the product was made.136 To evaluate the
product liability of the error condition described in Part III, a claimant would
need to identify all the products involved in the failure.137 This can be a
difficult task because of the numerous companies that are part of the supply
chain in this transaction, but it is required as a part of the liability analysis.
Following this logic, the types of products manufactured by different
companies that are potentially “defective” include: (1) the device that
captures the information; (2) the software used to gather the data and transmit
it to the physician’s system; (3) the connectivity platform(s) used to transmit
the data; and (4) the electronic medical record where the data that is
transmitted populates the medical information for review by the physician’s
clinical staff. After identifying all parties involved, the first concern in
determining fault is to discern how to identify where the point of failure
happened, which requires an individual with a background in the technology.
The more complex the software configuration, the more difficult it will be
for plaintiffs to identify the parties that can potentially be liable for the issue.
With data transferring across multiple platforms, interoperability will add
another layer of complexity.
Assume the first two hurdles are crossed—that all product owners can be
identified, and the cause of the failure can be determined. Assume further
that the failure in the error example is determined to be caused by multiple
sources. First, one source was hardware failure on one of the servers that
was part of the connectivity path that transmits the data from the wearable
device to the physician’s electronic medical record. The hardware failure
was caused by an electrical storm that yielded a power outage. Second,
assume that when the power was restored, the data that was being sent to the
EMR was corrupted, causing the software to reset to manufacturer settings,
populating the software’s default blood pressure value to 120/80.138
134

What is Product Liability?, FINDLAW (July 2, 2019),
https://www.findlaw.com/injury/product-liability/what-is-product-liability.html.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
See Corbin, supra note 126, at 2.
138
This example is based on real world conditions that can happen when data is transmitted
across multiple platforms and interact with multiple software applications. (When your heart
is at rest, between beats, your blood pressure falls. This is called diastolic pressure. Your
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There are three legal paths that a plaintiff can pursue under the traditional
product liability framework for the above example: (1) strict liability; (2)
negligence; and (3) breach of warranty.139 The following sections will
examine each doctrine to test traditional theory against new and emerging
technology, while also trying to establish guidelines for liability as a result
of the harm caused by these products.
A. Strict Liability
Strict liability applies to “products that can cause substantial harm, death,
or property damage due to defects.”140 The purpose of strict liability is to
“ensure that the manufacturers, developers, and/or sellers of defective
devices bear the costs” of harm a consumer experiences attributed to the
product.141 Strict liability does not require fault on the part of manufacturer,
so liability is automatic when a claimant proves that the product was
defective and it caused harm.142 Strict liability is intended to incentivize
manufacturers to weigh the relative “small” cost of mitigating the defective
design through preventative measures against releasing a product to the
market that has defects that would require the manufacturer to cover
potentially large damages caused by the defects.143
Strict liability has had limited application to digital technology.144 Its
limited application has been because of three primary factors.145 First, under
strict liability, the claim against the manufacturer cannot be based only on
financial loss.146 The economic loss doctrine147 limits claims of strict liability
to involve physical harm, death or property damages that are directly
attributed to the defective device.148 Historically, damages caused by digital
products have been based strictly on financial loss.149 However, as digital
technologies become increasingly integrated with other health devices, the
blood pressure reading uses these two numbers. Usually, the systolic number comes before
or above the diastolic number. For example, 120/80 means a systolic of 120 and a diastolic
of 80.
139
Corbin, supra note 126, at 20; see also Benjamin C. Dean, An Exploration of Strict
Liability and the Internet of Things, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (2018) https://cdt.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/2018-04-16-IoT-Strict-Products-Liability-FNL.pdf (discussing
policy concerns over the application of strict products liability to designers, manufacturers,
and retailers of digital products).
140
Corbin, supra note 126, at 21.
141
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Id.
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Id.
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See id. (defining the economic loss doctrine as when a product defect or failure results in
only economic loss but does not cause personal injury or damages to any other property).
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potential for physical harm may continue to grow.150 This can point to a
greater application of the strict liability doctrine to IoMT devices and
software because of the inherent risks.151 While the economic loss doctrine
has traditionally barred strict product liability from digital devices, it is likely
less of an impediment for the IoMT.152 Second, and potentially the most
important point, it is difficult to ascertain the root cause of harm or damages
when dealing with digital technology.153 Furthermore, when it is unclear
where along the supply chain liability will fall, it will be difficult to apply
strict liability because the doctrine requires the claimant to link the harm to
the defective device.154 IoMT differs from past technological developments
because of the vast supply chain that includes numerous manufacturers,
suppliers and developers.155 Lastly, there continues to be ambiguity around
the categorization of digital technology as a product or a service.156 Since
strict liability applies only to products, and in some states across the U.S. the
software may be viewed as an intangible item, there is no universal standard
that can be used for these types of claims.157 For these reasons, strict liability
may not provide a sufficient remedy for harm caused by this technology.158
In reviewing the error example for practical application of the strict
liability test, the analysis can be taken one step further. Although there is a
situation where the patient experienced physical harm instead of pure
economic loss, and the defect can potentially be applied to the hardware and
software manufacturers (albeit difficult to determine), it is possible that the
strict liability doctrine would be appropriate in this situation.159 However,
such a standard could stifle future innovation as the approach may be too
restrictive for the industry.160 There is no such thing as universally secure or
defect free software code.161 Even if IoMT manufacturers were subjected to
strict liability and took the most comprehensive measures to produce safe
products, the risk of liability would be so great that it may cause companies
to abandon the IoMT market.162 As a result, because the application of strict
150

Id.
See Dean, supra note 139, at 19 (discussing reasons for increased application of strict
liability to non-traditional products because of the risk of property damage and personal
injury incidents).
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See Corbin, supra note 126, at 21.
153
Id. (explaining consumers face an uphill battle in trying to prove digital defects led to the
harm).
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Id. at 22 (explaining there is no clear demarcation of liability along the supply chain so
the allocation of liability between parties will be difficult).
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liability will not generate the proper balancing of consumer harm and
manufacturer responsibility, strict liability, as it stands, cannot be easily
applied to IoMT.163
B. Negligence
The second theory of product liability applicable to IoMT is negligence.
Proof of negligence requires satisfying five elements: (1) a duty or standard
of care; (2) breach of that duty or standard of care; (3) cause in fact; (4)
proximate cause; and (5) damages.164 “One of the most common applications
of negligence to products liability occurs in the context of design defects.”165
A design defect claim alleges the product design was not reasonable in light
of the product’s risk of harm and the availability of safer alternative
designs.166 In a negligence claim, the standard of care is established by
evaluating whether the product posed a substantial likelihood of harm,
whether a safer product or design was available or could have been
implemented, and if the product in its current design caused harm to the
plaintiff.167 In the context of the IoMT, this evaluation can be problematic
for multiple reasons. First, even if the plaintiff can show that the software
was insecure, there is no such thing as completely secure code.168 In fact, it
is estimated that programmers make between ten and fifty errors for every
1000 lines of code.169 Second, it may be difficult to determine that a safer
alternative exists given the nature of the technology and the inherent flaws in
software; It is possible that any similar products would have similar issues.170
Additionally, if a plaintiff attempts to apply general negligence principles
outside the scope of design defects, the plaintiff may struggle to show the
existence of a duty of care. As noted, these products often fall outside of
regulatory guidance or may not be subject to government oversight.171
Returning to the error example, the injured party would have a difficult time
in demonstrating a breach of the duty of care because products that fall in the
IoMT category do not have an adopted consensus on the framework that
should be applied to these products.172 As such, either a discernible and
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Corbin, supra note 126, at 23.; See also Lewison v. Renner, 905 N.W.2d 540, 548 (Neb.
2018) (”When the character of an alleged injury is subjective rather than objective, a
plaintiff must establish the cause and extent of the injury through expert medical
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established standard needs to be specified or the negligence theory of product
liability will be inadequate to provide relief to the injured parties.173
C. Breach of Warranty
The third liability model that is applied to product liability claims is breach
of warranty.174 There are challenges with applying both common law
warranties and other warranties under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) to IoMT software and devices.175 The law surrounding whether
Article 2 applies to IoMT devices and software remains unclear.176 In a 2016
district court case involving Article 2’s role in a software transaction, the
court stated that “the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to
software is a question that has confounded courts in the digital age”.177 The
court further emphasized that “for every court that finds that the weight of
authority favors application of common law and not the UCC with regard to
software licenses, another finds that the sale of a software package may be
classified as the sale of a good for UCC purposes.”178 Other complications
arise in software transactions where software is combined with hardware, or
where other products are provided with the software.179 Even in cases where
software is provided without hardware, but is accompanied by development
or implementation services, courts still face the question of whether Article
2 governs.180
Common law warranties for IoMT also present problems.181 There are
two types of common law warranties to evaluate: express warranties and
implied warranties.182 Express warranties are explicit promises that devices
will perform in a particular manner.183 It may be difficult to apply express
warranties to the software portion of a device, or the software itself, given
the possibilities of software defects.184 Furthermore, software manufacturers
routinely evade liability for software vulnerabilities through end-user license
agreements.185 End-user license agreements often disclaim liability for such
173
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Id. (defining breach of warranty as a broken promise about a product made by either a
manufacturer or a seller).
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Id. (explaining IoMT has changed interactions between buyers and sellers, and has added
complexity through hybrid transactions).
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things as breaches, hacks, and other harms that can occur from insecure
code.186
Given our error example, a software or hardware manufacturer could
defend against a liability claim by citing a power outage as the proximate
cause for the software to “glitch.” The vendor could argue that because the
harm occurred without an inherent defect, any express warranty would be
invalid, assuming there was an end user agreement in place.
Turning to the other common law warranty, an implied warranty is
inferred when a manufacturer sells a product to a consumer.187 Typical
implied warranties include the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, the implied warranty of merchantability for goods, and the implied
warranty of workmanlike quality of services.188 As with express warranties,
however, a vendor can also disclaim implied warranties through contractual
terms.189 To this effect, if implied warranties are useful for plaintiffs in a
claim for liability, there needs to be an overriding law to prevent IoMT
vendors from avoiding liability through this means.
Referring to the error example, if any contractual terms include warranty
disclaimers, the hardware and software vendors can point to these provisions
to avoid liability.190 As a result, the patient in our example would have a
difficult time in a claim against the vendors and would likely be left without
a remedy. Furthermore, without relief from the vendors, the physician may
be the only available party with potential culpability in a cause of action.
This is yet another reason for clear regulatory direction when assessing
liability.
The remaining analysis of existing law will focus on the physician’s role
in the harm caused to the patient. Even with decisive rules around how to
determine liability for IoMT vendors, the physician’s role in the harm will
still be evaluated for comparative liability. Recalling the error example, the
clinical staff working for the physician did not notice there was an issue with
the blood pressure readings and failed to validate the data. The patient that
was admitted to the hospital for chest pains and shortness of breath can point
to the fact that the clinical staff had a responsibility, or a duty of care, to
recognize the error in the software and try to rectify it. Since the patient is
claiming liability on the part of the physician, or agents of the physician, the
next section will look at current malpractice law and how it can be applied to
the IoMT generally and the error example specifically.
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D. Medical Malpractice – Changes to Liability as the Standard of Care
Shifts
The standard of care for healthcare practitioners is an evolving standard
and does not exclude the appropriate use of technology in the care setting.191
Should the technology become adopted by a majority of healthcare
practitioners, it is highly likely that the industry may require its use.192
Therefore it is possible to anticipate the integration of advanced, and highly
capable AI in the care setting.193 Consequently, the question the industry
must ask is whether the use of such AI is appropriately, and adequately
supported by our existing legal and regulatory frameworks that can be
effectively evaluated in terms of medical malpractice.194
To hold a physician liable for medical malpractice under current law, there
are four basic requirements to initiate a claim: (1) a duty owed by a physician
to a patient; (2) a breach in the doctor’s duty to provide care to the patient;
(3); the breached duty to care results in the patient’s injury; and (4) that the
patient’s injury led to specific damages.195 The most relevant component to
this topic relates to the negligence criteria and how it is defined as a breach
of the physician’s duty of care in the new technology age. Physicians are not
held to a duty of perfect care, but a doctor must exercise the degree of skill
and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by a reasonably skillful and
careful practitioner under the same or similar circumstances.196
There is also some variance in how standard of care is determined among
the states to prove medical malpractice negligence.197 For example, some
jurisdictions have held that doctors have an additional duty to disclose the
risks associated with a treatment plan and discuss possible alternatives with
patients.198 This means that physicians will be held to a standard of care that
is measured against physicians with “like skills” or in the same specialty.199
If radiologists, for example, generally incorporate the use of AI technology
to assist in the interpretation and reading of exam results, and a radiologist
decides not to incorporate such technology in their own practice of medicine,
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the latter may be found to have not met the standard of care threshold
established by other physicians in the same field.200
Likewise, physicians who do incorporate the technology as part of normal
patient care can be required to disclose to their patients the fact that their
treatment plan includes the use of computer-based technology and
automation.
Going back to the error example, suppose the physician required the
patients that participated in the preventative wellness program sign an
informed consent document.201 As part of the informed consent, there may
be provisions that disclaim liability for any harm caused by the new
technology if it is outside of the physician’s control. This approach can be
problematic as the patient is highly unlikely to understand or be capable of
educating herself on the complexities of healthcare technology. As with end
user agreements, such disclaimers can lead to inadequate remedies for
patients when a technological failure occurs. Since there is the added
component of possible negligence on the part of the physician’s staff, with
none noticing the software error, there is a case for negligence on the part of
the physician. Given the intertwining of software defect and physician
negligence, it is important to establish a perceptible standard of care that can
be applied when assessing physician liability in such a situation.
Regardless of the types of technical assistance used by physicians,
malpractice law requires physicians to show they used the ordinary skill and
judgement of a “reasonably competent, similarly situated physician” when
treating patients.202 With technology advances continuing to be adopted in
healthcare and becoming the norm in patient care, the current standard of
care will surely shift.203 Regulatory guidance is needed to help define what
the standard of care looks like in the era of healthcare technology. This
guidance will instruct physicians on their obligations, while protecting
patients from the potential dangers that can exist when innovation becomes
part of the care process. It should be noted that under the context of medical
malpractice actions, other actors can be held vicariously liable for the actions
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of their employees.204 According to the general rule governing vicarious
liability, an employer or principal may be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the tortious conduct of an employee or agent acting
within the scope of his or her employment.205
V. NEW LEGAL STANDARD AND TESTS FOR LIABILITY DETERMINATION
Applying the aforementioned tort liability doctrines to the IoMT
technologies is difficult, for the reasons outlined, as well as the fact that the
law is built on legal doctrines that are primarily focused on human conduct,
which does not apply to technical innovation.206 Further compounding the
difficulty is the opaque nature and unforeseeable results of technologies such
as AI, both by the developers of the technology as well as the physicians who
are relying on the results to provide patients better health outcomes.207
A solution to this ambiguity and to fill the gaps identified is for a new
federal statute to be enacted that defines a new category of software. The
statute should identify what falls under this new category and define a
recognizable standard of care that can be applied to claims of liability for
software that fits in the category. The new statute should also define a threeprong test that will be the dispositive framework in determining how
responsibility should be attributed to both software manufacturers and
physicians.
A. New Software Category for IoMT
One of the goals of the new federal statute will be to fill the regulatory
gaps that exist in the current FDA framework in regards to software that falls
into an exclusion category and the risk assignment for regulating nonexcluded software as a medical device.208 As the regulatory scheme of the
FDA stands, an error that occurs in a software technology that falls into an
exclusion category, as well as a regulated technology that otherwise meets
all FDA requirements, would not be subjected to any further regulation.209
204
John D. Hodson, Liability of Hospital or Sanitarium for Negligence of Physician or
Surgeon, 51 A.L.R. 4th 235 §2(a) (1987).
205
Id.
206
Hannah R. Sullivan & Scott J. Schweikart, Are Current Tort Liability Doctrines Adequate
for Addressing Injury Caused by AI?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS 160, 162 (2019) (discussing the
difficulties of applying tort liability schemes to AI technologies).
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Published by LAW eCommons,

31

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 5

210

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

Vol. 31

By establishing a new category for all IoMT technologies, the statute can
provide an applicable liability standard for software that falls within the new
category. The FDA, as the regulatory body, would remain the same, and all
exclusions and risk categories would remain intact.
The new software category of IoMT would include all medical devices
and applications that connect to healthcare IT systems through online
computer networks.210 The category will be broad enough to cover emerging
medical technologies that may not be part of the current innovation
landscape. It is estimated that by 2025, the financial impact of IoMT on the
healthcare industry will range from $1.1 trillion to $2.5 trillion per year,
stemming from the significant efficiencies these technologies will bring in
treating chronically ill patients.211 With unexpected and incomprehensible
innovation at the forefront of patient care, the new category will need to cover
interoperability that may not exist today.
Importantly, the statute will set forth a new standard of care that needs to
be met by all software manufacturers as part of product liability. The level
of quality required for the products in the IoMT category will be an
“excessive preventable danger” standard. This standard will include
mitigation strategies that are required by all software manufacturers that fall
within the IoMT category. The excessive preventable danger standard is
based on the concept of the “crashworthy” doctrine.212 The crashworthy
doctrine originated when automakers made the argument that preventing car
accidents was beyond their control.213 The automakers pointed to the fact
that drivers were to be blamed for careless, inept, and impaired driving.214
Furthermore, they argued that passengers were also to be blamed for not
using safety features such as seat belts.215 At the same time, the auto industry
argued against calls to impose restrictions on car designs, complaining that
such restrictions would have a negative impact on sales.216
As accident rates in the 1960s continued to rise, public trust that
manufacturers would implement some form of safety measure declined.217
Consumer advocates made the case that the car companies, because of the
inherent nature of accidents occurring with their products, needed to make
reasonable design modifications to accommodate for safety, regardless of the
cause of the collision.218 In other words, while the car makers may not be
210
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directly responsible for the accident per se, they are responsible for the
“second collision,” or the impact between the passengers and the interior of
the car after the accident occurred.219 As argued to the courts, ultimately
successfully, the second collision theory broke a judicial impasse and
provided courts with a rebuttal against the claim by car manufacturers that
safety was too difficult to design.220 The courts concluded that although
building a crash proof car was impossible, installing safety equipment to
minimize additional passenger injury was not.221
The theory of crashworthiness can be extended to IoMT software
applications in the form of the excessive preventable danger standard.
Similar to car makers, it is impossible for software manufacturers to develop
error free code, so a defect or a “crash” of the software is inevitable.222
Therefore, holding IoMT software manufacturers to an unattainable standard
could significantly stifle innovation.223 However, it is still appropriate to
apply a standard to software manufacturers that requires the inclusion of a
fault tolerance system that will mitigate harm that can be caused by defects.
Since external forces, such as end users, nefarious actors such as hackers, and
environmental factors can also be attributed to the “first collision” or
software defects that are out of the developer’s control, the concept of
requiring the software developer to minimize harm caused by such defects
seems pertinent without being overly restrictive.224
Looking back at the aforementioned error example, when the electronic
medical record software defaulted the blood pressure data to 120/80, the
ramifications of the error could have been mitigated had the software
developer built a mechanism into the code to alert the end user to the potential
error. An example of an alert mechanism could be as simple as a message
that would display in the form of a system notification letting the user know
of the default event and advising the end user to validate the data for
accuracy. Furthermore, the software developer could also have built in a
fault tolerance mechanism, anticipating that a power outage may occur
during software data transmission. The fault tolerance system could prevent
the code from defaulting to an alternate value, and perhaps require the data
transmission to be resent in the event of a power outage. Although this kind
of fault tolerance can require additional processing, it can assure data
integrity in the event of an anticipated power failure.
These examples illustrate mitigation strategies that, if included, could
limit the software manufacturer’s liability based on the excessive preventable
danger standard. The standard offers the appropriate counterbalance between
219
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imposing an unattainable requirement and achieving the desired result of
limited harm caused by anticipated defects. This standard, coupled with the
new IoMT category that applies to all FDA software—both regulated and
unregulated—will give developers, physicians, and plaintiffs a clear
framework to apply for product liability claims.
The new federal statute would also include two provisions that further
address gaps in existing regulations. First, software vendors would be
precluded from disclaiming all liability through end user agreements, which
would eliminate any incentive that an IoMT has to consider consumer safety
and security.225 Software vendors need to acknowledge that “for an IoMT
liability model to be successful, there must be a foundational understanding
among all parties that failure to implement reasonable mitigation strategies
will result in grounds for punishment”.226 The idea of eliminating disclaimers
of liability in end user agreements is not novel; in fact, Senator Mark Warner
of Virginia recently proposed it as part of a bill in the 117th Congress.227
Senator Warner explained that “eliminating software makers’ long-held
exemption from liability lawsuits could be a key part of a cybersecurity plan”
and that a “fulsome debate” is needed regarding whether the software sector’s
legal immunity has outlived its usefulness, especially in an age of relentless
cyberattacks and software vulnerabilities.228 Warner continued saying that a
debate on this topic was needed in Congress, particularly regarding concerns
that the exemption would be applied to software too generally.229 As
proposed by virtue of the IoMT category, the new federal statute would only
apply to software fitting into this sector.
Second, if the plaintiff harmed by the use of IoMT technology is unable
to determine the exact cause of the harm, all products involved in the
“transaction” in question will be identified as potentially responsible parties
to the claim. These added provisions would further incentivize technology
vendors to help identify the cause of defects and to meet the new standard of
excessive preventable danger. As software used in conjunction with medical
devices has become more pervasive and intertwined, it is critical to view
development in a new light even though “just because we decided that
business productivity software manufacturers should not be held liable for
security flaws in their products during the growth period of this industry in
the 1990s does not mean all software manufacturers for all applications in all

225

See Corbin, supra note 126, at 3.
See id. at 28.
227
Cyber Response and Recovery Act of 2021, S. 1316, 117th Cong. (2021).
228
Charlie Mitchell, Mark Warner Eyes Liability for Software Developers as Key Way to
Shore Up Cybersecurity, WASH. EXAM’R., (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/technology/mark-warner-eyes-liability-forsoftware-developers-as-key-way-to-shore-up-cybersecurity.
229
Id.
226

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol31/iss1/5

34

Montesantos: Physician Liability in the Age of Data Reliance and Errors

2022

Physician Liability in the Age of Data Reliance and Errors

213

industries should get the same exemption forever”.230 Instead, with society
entering a new technological age marked by increased risk to the consumer
or patient, it is crucial that liability models progress accordingly.231
B. New Three-Prong Test for Assessing Liability
By establishing a new category of software that includes a discernible
standard for liability purposes, existing tort law theory—with only minor
modifications— can be used in claims that allege harm. The new statute can
lay the foundation for how to apply existing tort law theory based on a threeprong test. In particular, products that fall within the IoMT category will be
assessed under the following conditions. First, the software product will be
evaluated to determine if it falls under the FDA as a regulated product.232
IoMT products that are regulated by the FDA will continue to be subjected
to existing regulation, and the regulation will take precedence over the new
category of IoMT. To reach the second prong of the liability assessment, the
product(s) must fall into an exclusion category or be a regulated product that
meets all FDA regulations. It is important to note that although the FDA
regulates medical device safety and security, it lacks the authority and
requisite framework to apportion liability and remedies accordingly, which
stands as another gap that can be adequately filled with the new federal
statute.233
The second prong of the liability test would apply the appropriate product
liability theory to the claim against the IoMT technology vendor. As
previously indicated, the concept of strict liability is problematic when
applied to IoMT products.234 Although healthcare interoperable products
have the potential to cause severe harm, the effect of stifling innovation based
on such a strict standard is almost certain.235 Therefore, the new excessive
preventable danger standard will allow the application of both negligence and
breach of warranty theories, since a missing discernible standard makes these
theories problematic.
Furthermore, both negligence and breach of warranty theories are open to
plaintiffs using the new excessive preventable danger standard. As discussed
in Section IV, negligence is premised upon the violation of an established
standard of care.236 In the current landscape, because an established standard
of care is lacking, plaintiffs struggle to demonstrate that there has been a
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violation.237 The established standard included within the new federal
category of IoMT, however, allows plaintiffs to measure software
manufacturers against a guideline and further allows courts to evaluate
whether the software manufacturer used due diligence in creating software
that mitigates harm caused by defects through the prerequisite fault tolerance.
Similarly, since the new federal statute would also include a provision that
disallows software manufacturers from disclaiming liability by way of end
user agreements, software companies can be held to a warranty standard
again looking to how code was developed with defect mitigation as part of
the inherent product.
The established standard of care for software manufacturers and remedy
for patients harmed by IoMT also clarifies the role of the physician in
assessing liability responsibility and obligations. In particular, after liability
is established for the software manufacturers, the third prong of the liability
test utilizes existing malpractice standards to assess physician liability. In
this way, physicians can still be held to a level of responsibility for healthcare
technology, but their role will be secondary relating to the harm.
Consequently, physicians will have to show a willful negligence in their use
of the technology—a standard that will evolve as the technology evolves.238
Under this new statute, physicians are not responsible for software defects
per se, but instead are only responsible for their own negligent behavior; in
effect, encouraging physicians to adopt technology so they can adapt
appropriately to the new standard of care. Simultaneously, physicians will
not be required to understand the increasing complexities of technologies,
such as AI, but instead will be required to use them in a responsible way.
Reflecting upon the error example, had the physician’s staff been alerted to
the error by an appropriate warning message, the physician’s staff would
have been aware of the early warning signs from the patient and would have
allowed for earlier intervention. Inaction on the part of physicians or staff
could constitute negligence in providing care to the patient; however, without
the involvement of technology, this does not differ from the current standard
of care applied to physicians.
VI. CONCLUSION
The technology revolution has taken the healthcare sector by storm.239
The IoMT is revolutionizing both the practice of medicine, as well as patient
outcomes and behaviors.240 It is projected that by 2024, the medical
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innovation industry will be worth over $66 billion dollars, and the concept of
interconnected devices as part of patient care will be the rule rather than the
exception.241 New and evolving software and hardware has the promise of
providing care to patients in a more efficient way, including providing better
patient outcomes, as medical expertise, in the form of AI, is deployed through
a proactive approach. As this new digital health landscape becomes part of
the general public’s healthcare experience, it is increasingly important to
understand the benefits as well as the vulnerabilities of this technology.242
As showcased in a remarkably prescient 1993 episode of Law and Order,
a teenage hacker was able to remotely access the computer system of a
diabetes clinic and install a virus that caused insulin pumps to dispense
incorrect amounts of insulin, resulting in the death of multiple patients.243
Imagine the havoc that nefarious actors can play almost 30 years later! And
less dramatically, software defects that have the potential to cause harm to
patients will become more possible as interoperable technology is
intertwined with healthcare protocol. Formalizing a federal standard that
encourages healthcare technology innovation, while imposing a reasonable,
attainable standard to be applied to the technology in the event of error, is the
proper balance to foster innovation while protecting the patient. This new
standard will also encourage physicians to adopt new technology into their
practice of medicine, as they will understand their own liability exposure
when it comes to black box medicine.
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